














PROTECTION CONTROLS FOR HIGH POWER ACCELERATORS
The next generation hadron accelerators will operate with MW beams or store beams with an energy of
many 100 MJ. Such accelerators must be protected by fast and very reliable interlock systems to avoid
damage due to uncontrolled beam loss. Machine protection will constrain operation, but some operational
flexibility is still required for commissioning and performance optimization. This is a substantial challenge
for control systems and application programs. New tools are developed to face those challenges: critical
settings management, software interlocks, role based access to equipment, automatic accelerator mode
recognition etc. This talk presents some of the challenges and tools. Experience with novel approaches are
discussed.
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Abstract
The next generation hadron accelerators will operate
with MW beams or store beams with an energy of many
100 MJ. Such accelerators must be protected by fast and
very reliable interlock systems to avoid damage due to un-
controlled beam loss. Machine protection will constrain
operation, but some operational flexibility is still required
for commissioning and performance optimization. This
is a substantial challenge for control systems and appli-
cation programs. New tools are developed to face those
challenges: critical settings management, software inter-
locks, role based access to equipment, automatic acceler-
ator mode recognition etc. This talk presents some of the
challenges and tools. Experience with novel approaches
are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Present day high energy hadron machines like SPS,
TEVATRON (and formerly also HERA-p) accelerate
beams with stored energies of a few MJ. The Large Hadron
Collider (LHC), presently in the hardware commissioning
phase, will store beams of 360 MJ at its design luminosity
of 1034 cm−2s−1 [1].The energy stored in the LHC beams
is more than a factor of 100 higher with respect to the exist-
ing machines, see Figure 1. At 7 TeV the damage level for
accelerator components is four orders of magnitude smaller
than the nominal beam current [2].
A number of hadron accelerators in operation or under
construction reach beam powers in the range of 1 to 10 MW
at PSI [6], at the Neutron Spallation Source (SNS) [3] lo-
cated at ORNL as well as JPARC in Japan. Future neu-
trino factories are aiming for beam powers on target in the
multi-MW range. The IFMIF (International Fusion Mate-
rial Irradiation Facility) facility aims for deuteron beams
for neutron production of around 10 MW.
High electron and photon beam powers are also achieved
in third and fourth generation light sources, FELs and in
high power electron accelerators at Jefferson Lab [8].
Machine protection systems (MPS) are an integral part
of the design of such high power machines that are pro-
tected by large numbers of interlock channels. Uncon-
trolled release of even a small fraction of the stored beam
energy may cause serious damage to equipment or exces-
sice activation. SNS for example runs in a loss dominated
regime with a maximum allowable loss rate a 1 W/m which
corresponds to a relative loss rate of≈ 10−4/m of the nom-
inal power [3]. Fast interlock systems based on hardware
links are used to achieve high reliability in transmitting in-
terlocks signals to dump or extraction kickers, guns etc.
The reaction times of such system range from microsec-
onds to some ten’s of milliseconds depending on the hard-
ware platform and on the criticality of the equipment. Be-
sides the hardware aspects of the MPS, there is a grow-
ing amount of control aspects that have to be managed and
that become more critical as the stored energy and power
increase. The is particularly important when the MPS in-
corporates some flexibility for setting up and commission-
ing of the accelerator.A modern MPS should be integrated
into the accelerator control system to ease diagnostics, pro-
vide reliable testing, limit undesired access to MPS related
equipment settings. High availability dictates automated
analysis and recovery processes after MPS triggered faults.
Figure 1: Stored beam energy as a function of the momen-
tum for various accelerators.
ACCESS CONTROL
Securing the access to the accelerator control system is
an essential part of the protection strategy. The access must
be limited to avoid undesired changes to machine settings
by outsiders, and to ensure that the accelerator operation
crews remain in full control of the machine. The access
control issue is most critical for controls system devices
and parameters that are part of the MPS, for example inter-
lock thresholds. While on one hand access to the acceler-
ator must be strictly controlled, experts, but also software
developers must be granted access to the accelerator de-
vices for interventions and debugging.
A first level protection of the control system consists in
separating the accelerator network from the general inter-
net. Access to the accelerator controls network is then only
possible through a limited number of gateways with strict
access control lists. Such a strategy is used for the CERN
accelerators only since 2006, but it is also used at light
sources, for example at the Swiss Light Source. At CERN
access is presently also granted to a number of trusted hosts
connected to the general CERN network. But in the near
future access to the accelerator control system will only be
possible through the special gateways.
Limiting access to critical devices and their settings to
the experts through some form of login is the second level
of control that does not necessarily require highly special-
ized controls solutions. Such schemes are in use at almost
all facilities, even though some operate without particular
protection. Those isolated cases involve however small(er)
teams and are not part of the accelerators at the top of the
power hit list.
Access control by location (of the computer) is another
simple scheme, used for example at FNAL. Depending on
the location of a computer, the user will have full access to
all settings (main control room), or only limited access and
for a limited duration.
Role Based Access Control
A sophisticated access control relying on a role-based
system (RBAC) is put in place for the CERN accelerator
network in collaboration with FNAL [5]. In this scheme ac-
cess to a specific parameter is limited to persons holding a
given role. A role is typically a job function, such as LHC-
Operator, BLM-Expert, MPS-Expert etc. A user can have
multiple roles at any time, and any user can be a member
of any role. To access a device within the control system,
a user has to login with his normal CERN userid/password
and the RBAC system authenticates the user. If authentica-
tion is successful, the user can select one of his roles to ac-
cess a set of accelerator devices. Each device property may
be protected with access rules. These rules specify what
roles can access settings. In addition to the roles, three
other parameters can be specified in an access rule: the lo-
cation (i.p. host address), the application, and the acceler-
ator mode. This access scheme will be used by physicists
and engineers of FNAL to remotely access certain LHC
devices from FNAL: magnets that are part of the US con-
tribution to LHC, beam instrumentation data, etc.
RBAC is presently in a progressive deployment phase
within the LHC control system.
MPS CONFIGURATION
The correct functioning of the MPS can only be fullfilled
when the configuration of the devices that are part of the
MPS is correct, for example correct assignment of settings,
activation of the appropriate device etc. In many places
the configurations are stored in (or derived from) a ’master’
machine database that holds the description of the accelera-
tor, see for example Ref. [9]. An essential operation during
commissioning, but also after periodic shutdowns, is the
validation of the MPS configuration or of the changes to the
configuration. The validation frequently involves ’manual’
verification by one or more experts. Changes to the config-
urations are frequently decided by a laboratory or machine
safety authority.
During commissioning and controlled machine experi-
ments phases part of the MPS constraints must sometimes
be relaxed. This may in particular be the case for the com-
missioning of the MPS with beam, for example to calibrate
BLMs or setup collimators and protection devices. Relax-
ing the constraints may be performed by either masking
certain interlock channels or by adapting MPS parameters
like thresholds etc.
Machine and Beam Modes
A commonly used scheme to adapt the MPS to the run-
ning conditions is to define a number of machine and beam
modes [3, 4, 8, 11]. The modes are adapted according to the
state of beam dumps, target positions, gun configurations
etc. A pre-configured interlock channel map is defined in
advance for each mode, and the MPS automatically applies
the maps and masks out a certain category of interlocks. In
some cases, like for example SNS, the threshold of certain
BLMs are automatically increased before a flying wire is
send through the beam for an emittance measurement. At
the CERN SPS the operator defines the mode for each of
the beams. A software interlock system [11] verifies that
the declared modes match the actual state of the accelera-
tor.
Such mode-based schemes are very powerful, but some-
times do not provide sufficient flexibility. They are usu-
ally well adapted to cope with standard machine operation
modes, but are not always sufficiently flexible for machine
commissioning or setup phases.
Figure 2: Impact of a 450 GeV/c beam from the CERN SPS
onto a Copper plate inserted into a 20 cm long target [2].
The position of this plate within the target corresponds ap-
proximately to the peak energy density. Four beams of dif-
ferent intensities were send to the target: 1.2 × 1012 (A),
2.4× 1012 (B), 4.8× 1012 (C) and 7.2× 1012 (D) protons.
Safe Beam Concept
The LHC MPS does not use a mode scheme but relies
on the concept of a ’Safe’ beam. Each hardware interlock
connected to the LHC MPS is preconfigured to be either
maskable or unmaskable [1]. Unmaskable interlocks will
always remain active, irrespective of the machine or beam
state: they include vacuum valves, dump system state, crit-
ical power converter states. Maskable interlocks may be
masked provided the beam is considered to be safe. As
soon as the beam becomes unsafe, the interlock system will
automatically re-active any masked input.
A beam is considered safe at LHC injection energy of
450 GeV/c if its intensity is below 1012 protons for the
nominal emittance of 3.5 µm. The intensity of the safe
beam is scaled with energy according to a E−1.7 scaling
law obtained from simulations. The safe beam limit de-
pends on the material, and for the case of the LHC it is
defined for Copper, which is common in many accelera-
tor components. The simulation results have been bench-
marked in an experiment with a 450 GeV/c beam in an SPS
extraction line [2] as shown in Figure 2. The safe beam in-
formation is transmitted to the components of the SPS and
LHC MPS in the form of a logical flag.
The LHC safe beam concept has been designed to pro-
vide a high level of safety. A possible drawback is the miss-
ing granularity of the concept with only two states, safe or
not. In certain conditions a higher granularity might be de-
sirable.
Management of Critical Settings
Handling the large number of MPS settings is very crit-
ical for the LHC. To provide a safe, but relatively simple
and homogenous solution for all MPS parameters that are
subject to be changed (trimmed), the concept of ’Critical
Setting’ was introduced [5]. A critical setting is any ma-
chine setting that is relevant for the safety of machine oper-
ation or for the MPS system: for example BLM thresholds,
calibration tables of the beam dump kickers, fine delays of
the injection kickers etc. There are two issues for such pa-
rameters: first, only a limited number of persons must be
allowed to change the parameters and secondly it is impor-
tant that the values are not corrupted, either when sending
the value to the device, or due to data corruption or data
loss at the level of the device, for example after a reboot.
The solution adopted for the CERN control system in
view of the LHC is based on the private-public key encryp-
tion mechanism for which algorithms and implementations
are readily available. Each critical parameter set is assigned
a digital signature that is obtained by encoding a hash of the
data with a private key. Both the parameter and its digital
signature are stored in the controls database, and the pa-
rameter values are visible for anyone able to access the ap-
plication that can visualize the settings. Both the parameter
and its digital signature are send to the front-end computer
(FEC). On reception of the critical parameter, the FEC ver-
ifies the integrity of the data by comparing the data with its
digital signature using the public key. The parameter set-
ting is only accepted if data and signature agree, else the
setting is refused and an exception is thrown. This concept
is illustrated in Figure 3. Storing the signature together
with the data ensures that no changes may be performed
deliberately or accidentally in the database. The integrity
of the setting in the database, of the signature stored in the
database and of the setting value stored in the FEC are ver-
ified periodically, typically once or twice per day before
beam is injected into the LHC. In case of inconsistency in-
jection of beam into the LHC is inhibited.
The critical settings concept will be fully integrated into
the control system, and software developers do not have to
make any additional effort to define a critical setting. Gen-
eration and verification of the digital signatures are trans-
parent for the developper. Each critical setting is associ-
ated to a role of the CERN RBAC system (see previous
chapters) and only users that are assigned to the appropriate
role may obtain the keys to change and properly encrypt the
data. The system is presently in a first deployment phase,
but must be made operational for the startup of the LHC.
MPS VALIDATION AND VERIFICATION
An essential task during the commissioning and after ac-
celerator maintenance periods is the validation of the MPS
functionality. For large MPS systems such tasks cannot
be performed ’by hand’ by operators or experts, and au-
tomated test sequences must be employed. The advantage
of automated sequences is that they can be run periodically.
Careful specification, development and validation of the se-
quencing itself must be performed by the system experts
before such a sequencing task may be used to validate MPS
functions.
Automated schemes were foreseen at SNS [3] and are
already employed at the SPS for the high intensity transfer
lines due to the large number of interlock channels (over
500). Automated test sequences, based on a ’sequencer’
tool used for LHC commissioning and operation, will be
used to commission some large LHC MPS sub-systems,
in particular for magnet powering. The sequencer has
been employed very successfully in the commissioning of
the protection systems for the LHC superconducting mag-
nets [10]. The sequencer not only triggers the tests, it also
collects data (including post-mortem data) and automati-
cally enters test results into the controls database.
Periodic and continuous checks of the MPS are per-
formed at the SPS and in the future at the LHC by a Soft-
ware Interlock System (SIS) [11]. SIS surveys the accel-
erator and its transfer lines by software monitoring of a
large number of parameters and states, including the con-
figuration of the MPS itself (for example thresholds etc).
In case a problem is detected SIS may inhibit injection, ex-
traction or even dump the beam. SIS is also sending in-
formation across the machines to the injectors to ensure
that the beam is stopped at the source. One of the roles of
SIS is the integrity check of parts of the MPS system. It
is also used to implement complex interlocks that require
input from a number of systems, in particular when such
systems are distributed over the machine. As an example
Figure 3: Schema of the CERN critical settings management system.
the SIS will ensure that the LHC horizontal orbit correc-
tors do not change the beam energy by more than ±0.2%,
since this contribution to the beam energy is not taken into
account by the LHC Beam Dumping System.
MPS DIAGNOSTICS
Whenever the MPS system is triggered it is important
to trace the source of the problem as precisely as possible.
This is required to ensure that the MPS reacted correctly
(detection of near-misses or incorrect handling of faults)
and to optimize the machine uptime by understanding fre-
quently re-occurring faults.
Depending on the type of machine, linear or circular, the
data collection is different. For a linac or a transfer line,
data is normally collected for every beam passage. This
provides both the data necessary to understand the ’steady-
state’ operation of the line and any abnormal event, includ-
ing the events that lead to MPS triggers. Having the possi-
bility to compare events with MPS triggers and with other
beam passages is usefull to diagnose possible trends that
led to the MPS events. Such continuous logging is for ex-
ample performed at the SPS high energy transfer lines [12]
and at FLASH [4].
Post-mortem Diagnostics
For circular accelerators where the beam may be stored
for many hours, a continuous logging system is important
to understand the performance, but not sufficient to diag-
nose the transients around a MPS event, for example a
quench or a BLM trigger. The recording of the transient
data around the MPS event is of utmost importance, and
this data recording is usually designated as Post-mortem
(PM) data. The time resolution that is required ranges
from nanoseconds for feedbacks or RF systems to machine
turns for beam instrumentation and to few milliseconds for
slow power converter status information. A precise and fast
trigger mechanisms must be provided, and circular buffers
must be filled at the appropriate rate by the monitoring de-
vices. The trigger distribution for the PM event must also
be foreseen, since in many cases it is necessary to col-
lect data from devices that did not directly trigger the MPS
event. Post-mortem system for all or part of the diagnostics
is nowadays available in all accelerators [3, 6, 7, 13].
At the LHC a post-mortem system has been foreseen
from the start [13] and circular PM buffer have been in-
tegrated into all essential accelerator systems. The trigger
for the PM buffers is distributed by the LHC timing sys-
tem, except for the devices that are self-triggering, like for
example quench protection systems. Very precise times-
tamping must be performed for all the data to ensure that
the proper time sequence may be reconstructed. The times-
tamping information is distributed by the machine timing
system. Under certain conditions it is possible to suppress
the collection of post-mortem data for injection studies and
when only one out of the two beams is dumped for a ma-
chine experiment.
Table 1 lists data volumes for post-mortem events at a
number of accelerators. For the LHC the data volumes are
in the multi-GB range, which poses problems of data col-
lection and requires automated data analysis. Such auto-
mated analysis is already provided for the commissioning
of the LHC powering and quench protection systems [10].
For the LHC startup only a limited number of simple anal-
ysis are foreseen for beam data. It is expected that the anal-
ysis and display requirements will become clearer once the





FLASH (5 Hz) 1 MB / shot
CNGS (0.1 Hz) 0.1 MB / shot
Table 1: Post-mortem data volumes for diagnostics at dif-
ferent facilities.
Post Operational Checks
At the LHC the beam dumping and interlock systems
play a vital role for the protection of the machine since they
are unique and have no operational spare that can replace
their function in case of problems. To ensure that the sys-
tems are ’as good as new’ after each beam dump (MPS
event), both systems will perform automated Post Oper-
ational Checks (POC) based on their post-mortem data.
Figure 4: Recording of the field in an LHC beam dump
kicker. This trace is analyzed as part of the LHC Beam
Dumping System IPOC to validate the correct functioning
of each magnet. The markers (magenta) are the reference
points used for the analysis. The horizontal scale in in µs.
Both systems are highly redundant, but to ensure the re-
quired safety levels it is essential that the redundancy is
not lost. For that reason the post-mortem data is automat-
ically analyzed to detect any malfunctioning or loss of re-
dundancy of the systems. For the case of the LHC Beam
Dumping System, the POCs included internal data from
the kicker and triggering system (IPOC, Internal POC) and
external data from beam instrumentation (XPOC, eXternal
POC). The beam dumping system will go to a fault state in
case the IPOC or XPOC fail, requiring an intervention by
an expert to analyse the situation. Figure 4 shows the data
for a kicker magnet deflection.
CONCLUSION
Protection of the present day and future high intensity
accelerators is a challenging task that not only involves fast
hardware interlock components but also many control sys-
tem aspects. Access control is becoming a critical issue
and configuration changes of the MPS system must be well
controlled and tracked to ensure that no information is lost
on configuration changes.
Flexibility is provided in many places with the concept
of machine and beam mode that allows automatic configu-
ration changes of the MPS system configuration for differ-
ent running modes. Settings control based on digital sig-
natures using the public-private key principle are now im-
plemented at CERN for the SPS and the LHC. The digital
signature of the settings is used to prevent and uncontrolled
change or data corruption.
The large number of interlocks of modern accelerators
require automated testing of the main functions of the MPS
system. At the LHC sequencer program is executing care-
fully designed task sequences to validate the protection
functionality for large systems.
Diagnostics of MPS triggered event is provided every-
where by Post-mortem systems or shot-by-shot logging and
analysis. For the case of the LHC the most critical compo-
nents of the MPS will perform self-checks based on their
post-mortem data to ensure that no malfunctioning may be
undetected for some time.
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